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It is a neat result from functional programming that libraries of parser combinators can support rapid construc-
tion of decoders for quite a range of formats. With a little more work, the same combinator program can denote
both a decoder and an encoder. Unfortunately, the real world is full of gnarly formats, as with the packet
formats that make up the standard Internet protocol stack. Most past parser-combinator approaches cannot
handle these formats, and the few exceptions require redundancy – one part of the natural grammar needs to
be hand-translated into hints in multiple parts of a parser program. We show how to recover very natural
and nonredundant format specifications, covering all popular network packet formats and generating both
decoders and encoders automatically. The catch is that we use the Coq proof assistant to derive both kinds of
artifacts using tactics, automatically, in a way that guarantees that they form inverses of each other. We used
our approach to reimplement packet processing for a full Internet protocol stack, inserting our replacement
into the OCaml-based MirageOS unikernel, resulting in minimal performance degradation.
1 INTRODUCTION
Decoders and encoders are vital components of any software that communicates with the outside
world, and accordingly functions that process untrusted data represent a key attack surface for
malicious actors. Failures to produce or interpret standard formats routinely result in data loss,
privacy violations, and service outages in deployed systems [1–3]. In the case of formally verified
systems, bugs in encoder and decoder functions that live in the unverified, trusted code have
been shown to invalidate the entire assurance case [22]. There are no shortage of code-generation
frameworks [7–9, 19–21, 27, 35, 40, 41, 49, 53] that aim to reduce opportunities for user error in
writing encoders and decoders, but these systems are quite tricky to get right and have themselves
been sources of serious security bugs [4].
Combinator libraries are an alternative approach to the rapid development of parsers which
has proven particularly popular in the functional-programming community [32]. This approach
has been adapted to generate both parsers and pretty printers from single programs [29, 44].
Unfortunately, combinator libraries suffer from the same potential for bugs as code-generation
frameworks, with the additional possibility for users to introduce errors when extending the library
with new combinators. This paper presents Narcissus, a combinator-style framework for the Coq
proof assistant that eliminates the possibility of such bugs, enabling the derivation of encoders
and decoders that are correct by construction. Each derived encoder and decoder is backed by a
machine-checked functional-correctness proof, and Narcissus leverages Coq’s proof automation
to help automate both the construction of encoders and decoders and their correctness proofs. Key
to our approach is how it threads information through a derivation, in order to generate decoders
and encoders for the sorts of non-context-free languages that often appear in standard networking
protocols.
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We begin by introducing the key features of Narcissus with a series of increasingly complex
examples, leading to a hypothetical format of packets sent by a temperature sensor to a smart home
controller. In order to build up the reader’s intuition, we deliberately delay a discussion of the full
details of our approach until Section 2. The code accompanying our tour is included in our code
supplement in the src/Narcissus/Examples/README.v file.
1.1 A Tour of Narcissus
Getting started. Our first format is extremely simple:
1.1: User inputRecord sensor_msg :=
{ stationID: word 8; data: word 16 }.
Let format :=
format_word ◦ stationID
++ format_word ◦ data.
Let invariant (msg: sensor_msg) := ⊤.
Let enc_dec: EncDecPair format invariant :=
ltac:(derive_encoder_decoder_pair).
1.2: EncoderLet encode := encoder_impl enc_dec.
stationID≫SetCurrentByte ≫
data≫(high_bits 8≫SetCurrentByte ≫
low_bits 8≫SetCurrentByte)
1.3: DecoderLet decode := decoder_impl enc_dec.
b← GetCurrentByte;
b0 ← GetCurrentByte;
b’← GetCurrentByte;
w← ret b0 ·b’;
ret {| stationID := b; data := w |}
All user input is contained in box 1.1. sensor_msg is a record type with two fields; the Coq Record
command defines accessor functions for these two fields. format specifies how instances of this
record are serialized using two format combinators: format_word is a Narcissus primitive that
serializes a word bit-by-bit, and ++ is a sequencing operator (write this, then that). invariant
specifies additional constraints on well-formed packets, although this example does not have any.
The derive_encoder_decoder_pair tactic is part of the framework and automatically generates
encoder and decoder functions, as well as proofs that they are correct.
Boxes 1.2 and 1.3 show the generated code. In box 1.2, the encoder operates on a data value
and a fixed-size byte buffer (both implicit) and returns the encoded packet, or None if it did not fit
in the supplied buffer. In box 1.3, the decoder takes a buffer and returns a packet, or None if the
buffer did not contain a valid encoding. Both generated programs live in stateful error monads (←
and ≫ are the usual binding and sequencing operators), offering primitives to read and write a
single byte (GetCurrentByte, SetCurrentByte). The encoder uses the≫ reverse-composition
operator (a ≫ b ≡ b ◦ a) to pass record fields to SetCurrentByte. Since data is 16 bits long,
the encoder also uses high_bits and low_bits to extract the first and last 8 bits, and the decoder
reassembles them using the · concatenation operator: this byte-alignment transformation is part of
the derive_encoder_decoder_pair logic.
Underspecification. We now consider a twist: to align data on a 16-bit boundary, we introduce 8
bits of padding after stationID; these bits will be reserved for future use:
2.1: User inputRecord sensor_msg :=
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{ stationID: word 8; data: word 16 }.
Let format :=
format_word ◦ stationID
++ format_unused_word 8
++ format_word ◦ data.
Let invariant (msg: sensor_msg) := ⊤.
Let enc_dec: EncDecPair format invariant :=
ltac:(derive_encoder_decoder_pair).
2.2: EncoderLet encode := encoder_impl enc_dec.
stationID≫SetCurrentByte ≫
const 0b00000000≫SetCurrentByte ≫
data≫(high_bits 8≫SetCurrentByte ≫
low_bits 8≫SetCurrentByte)
2.3: DecoderLet decode := decoder_impl enc_dec.
b← GetCurrentByte;
_← GetCurrentByte;
b1 ← GetCurrentByte;
b’← GetCurrentByte;
w← ret b1 ·b’;
ret {| stationID := b; data := w |}
These eight underspecified bits introduce an asymmetry: the encoder always writes 0x00, but
the decoder accepts any value. The lax behavior is crucial because the format_unused_word
specification allows conforming encoders to output any 8-bit value; as a result, a correct decoder for
this format needs to accept all 8-bit values. In that sense, the encoder and decoder that Narcissus
generates are not strict inverses of each other: the encoder is one among many functions permitted
by the formatting specification, and the decoder is the inverse of the entire family described by the
format, accepting packets serialized by any conforming encoder.
Constants and enums. Our next enhancements are to add a version number to our format and to
tag each measurement with a kind, "TEMP" or "HUMIDITY". To save space, we allocate 2 bits for
the tag and 14 bits for the measurement:
3.1: User inputLet kind :=
EnumType ["TEMP"; "HUMIDITY"].
Record sensor_msg :=
{ stationID: word 8; data: (kind * word 14) }.
Let format :=
format_word ◦ stationID
++ format_unused_word 8
++ format_const 0b0000011111100010
++ format_enum [0b00; 0b01] ◦ fst ◦ data
++ format_word ◦ snd ◦ data.
Let invariant (msg: sensor_msg) := ⊤.
Let enc_dec: EncDecPair format invariant :=
ltac:(derive_encoder_decoder_pair).
3.2: EncoderLet encode := encoder_impl enc_dec.
stationID≫SetCurrentByte ≫
const 0b00000000≫SetCurrentByte ≫
const 0b00000111≫SetCurrentByte ≫
const 0b11100010≫SetCurrentByte ≫
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(λ r⇒ (Vector.nth [0b00; 0b01] ◦ fst ◦ data) r · (snd ◦ data) r)
≫(high_bits 8≫SetCurrentByte ≫
low_bits 8≫SetCurrentByte)
3.3: DecoderLet decode := decoder_impl enc_dec.
b← GetCurrentByte;
_← GetCurrentByte;
b1 ← GetCurrentByte;
b’← GetCurrentByte;
w← ret b1 ·b’;
(if weq w 0b0000011111100010 then
b2 ← GetCurrentByte;
b’0 ← GetCurrentByte;
w0 ← ret b2 ·b’0 ;
match index (high_bits 2 w0 ) [0b00; 0b01] with
| Some a’→ ret {| stationID := b; data := (a’, low_bits 14 w0 ) |}
| None→ fail end
else fail)
The use of format_const in the specification forces conforming encoders to write out the value
0x7e2, encoded over 16 bits. Any input that does not contain that exact sequence is malformed,
which the generated decoder signals by throwing an exception. Narcissus also checks more subtle
dependencies between subformats: for example, if a format were to encode the same value twice,
the generated decoder will decode both values and check that they agree— the packet must be
malformed if not. The argument passed to format_enum specifies which bit patterns to use to
represent each tag (0b00 for "TEMP", 0b01 for "HUMIDITY"), and the decoder uses this mapping to
reconstruct the appropriate enum member.
Lists and dependencies. Our penultimate example illustrates data dependencies and input restric-
tions. To do so, we replace our single data point with a list of measurements (for conciseness, we
remove tags and use 16-bit words):
4.1: User inputRecord sensor_msg :=
{ stationID: word 8; data: list (word 16) }.
Let format :=
format_word ◦ stationID
++ format_unused_word 8
++ format_const 0b0000011111100010
++ format_list format_word ◦ data.
Let invariant (msg: sensor_msg) := ⊤.
Let enc_dec: EncDecPair format invariant :=
ltac:(derive_encoder_decoder_pair).
The format_list combinator encodes a value by simply applying its argument combinator in
sequence to each element of a list. We start a derivation as before, but we quickly run into an issue:
the derivation fails, leaving multiple Coq goals unsolved. The first of these shows the portion of
the format where derive_encoder_decoder_pair got stuck:
CorrectDecoder (format_list format_word ◦ data ++ …) ?d
Using an additional tactic takes us to the last unsolvable goal, which is equivalent to the following:
∀ msg: sensor_msg, stationID msg = sid→ length msg.(measurements) = ?Goal
This goal indicates that the derivation got stuck trying to find a decoder for the list of measurements.
The issue is that the built-in list decoder is only applicable if the number of elements to decode is
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known, but our format never encodes the length of the data list.
An attempt to fix this problem by including the length of data does not completely solve the
problem, unfortunately (format_nat 8 ◦ length specifies that the length should be truncated to
8 bits and written out):
5.1: User inputLet format :=
format_word ◦ stationID
++ format_nat 8 ◦ length ◦ data
++ format_const 0b0000011111100010
++ format_list format_word ◦ data.
Indeed, the decoder derivation now gets stuck on the following goal:
CorrectDecoder (format_nat 8 ◦ length ◦ data ++ …) ?d
Our debugging tactic now produces the following goal:
∀ data: sensor_msg, invariant data ∧ stationID data = proj→
length data.(measurements) < 216
The problem is that, since we encode the list’s length on 8 bits, the round-trip property that
Narcissus enforces only holds if the list has fewer than 28 elements: larger lists have their lengths
truncated, and it becomes impossible for the decoder to know for certain how many elements it
should decode. What we need is an input restriction: a predicate defining which messages we may
encode. To this end, we make one final adjustment:
6.1: User inputLet invariant (msg: sensor_msg) :=
length (msg.(data)) < 28 .
6.2: EncoderLet encode := encoder_impl enc_dec.
stationID≫SetCurrentByte ≫
data≫Datatypes.length≫natToWord 8≫SetCurrentByte ≫
const 0b00000111≫SetCurrentByte ≫
const 0b11100010≫SetCurrentByte ≫
data≫AlignedEncodeList (λ _⇒ high_bits 8≫SetCurrentByte ≫
low_bits 8≫SetCurrentByte)
6.3: DecoderLet decode := decoder_impl enc_dec.
b← GetCurrentByte;
b0 ← GetCurrentByte;
b1 ← GetCurrentByte;
b’← GetCurrentByte;
w← ret b1 ·b’;
(if weq w 0b0000011111100010 then
l← ListAlignedDecodeM (λ _⇒
w0 ← GetCurrentByte;
w’← GetCurrentByte;
ret w0 ·w’) (wordToNat b0 );
ret {| stationID := b; data := l |}
else fail)
User-defined formats. Our final example illustrates a key benefit of the combinator-based approach:
integration of user-defined formats and decoders. The advantage here is that Narcissus does not
sacrifice correctness for extensibility: every derived function must be correct. This example uses
a custom type for sensor readings, reading. To integrate this type into Narcissus, the user also
supplies the format specification for this type, corresponding encoders and decoders and proofs
of their correctness, and a set of tactics explaining how to integrate this record into a derivation.
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Section 5 provides the complete details on these ingredients, but for now we note that the format-
_reading specification is nothing more exotic than a nondeterministic function in the style of the
Fiat framework [16], and that the two lemmas are normal interactive Coq proofs.
7.1: User inputInductive reading :=
| Temperature (_ : word 14) | Humidity (_ : word 14).
Let fmt_reading m s := match m with
| Temperature t⇒ ret (serialize (0b00 · t) s)
| Humidity h⇒ ret (serialize (0b01 · h) s) end.
Let enc_reading := ….
Lemma enc_readingCorrect: CorrectEncoder fmt_reading enc_reading. …
Let dec_reading := ….
Lemma dec_readingCorrect: CorrectDecoder fmt_reading dec_reading. …
Ltac new_encoder_rules ::= apply enc_readingCorrect.
Ltac new_decoder_rules ::= apply dec_readingCorrect.
Record sensor_msg :=
{ stationID: word 8; data: list reading }.
Let format :=
format_word ◦ stationID
++ format_nat 8 ◦ length ◦ data
++ format_list fmt_reading ◦ data.
Let invariant (msg: sensor_msg) :=
length (msg.(data)) < 28 .
Let enc_dec: EncDecPair format invariant :=
ltac:(derive_encoder_decoder_pair).
Wrapping up. In Narcissus, users specify formats using a library of combinators, and use
tactics to automatically derive correct-by-construction encoder and decoder functions from these
specifications. Formats may be underspecified, in that a particular source value may be serialized
in different ways, but decoders are guaranteed to correctly interpret all of them. Formats may
induce dependencies between subformats; the derivation procedure is responsible for tracking
these dependencies when generating a decoder. Finally, a user can extend Narcissus with new
formats and datatypes by providing a few simple ingredients; extensions are guaranteed not to
compromise the correctness of derived functions.
To more precisely summarize this paper’s contributions:
• We develop specifications of correctness for encoders and decoders, keyed on a common
nondeterministic format.
• We show how encoder and decoder combinators can be verified modularly, even when
their correctness depends on the contexts in which they are used, in a way that enables
compositional verification of composite encoders and decoders built from combinators.
• We show how to derive correct-by-construction encoders and decoders via interactive proof
search using libraries of verified combinators, and provide proof tactics to automate the
process in a way that supports extension without compromising soundness.
• We demonstrate how a two-phase approach which iteratively refines bit-level specifications
into byte-level functions can enable both clean specifications and efficient implementations.
We demonstrate the applicability of Narcissus by deriving packet processers for a full Internet
protocol stack, which required the addition of a checksum combinator. Inserting our replacement
into the OCaml-based MirageOS unikernel results in minimal performance degradation.
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We pause briefly here to contrast the design choices made by Narcissus with other approaches
to serializing and deserializing data, with a fuller discussion deferred to Section 7. There has been
a particular focus on formally verifying parsers and pretty printers for programming-language
ASTs as parts of compiler frontends [10, 28, 31] or to carry out binary analysis [38, 51]. One of the
target applications of Narcissus is formally verified distributed systems, and the restriction to
context-free languages (as found in those tools) disallows many of the standard network formats
such applications require.
Narcissus has a similar motivation to bidirectional programming languages [12, 39] in which
programs can be run “in reverse” to map target values to the source values that produced them.
The bidirectional programming language Boomerang adopts a similar combinator-based approach
to deriving transformations between target and source values. Invertibility is an intrinsic property
of bidirectional languages, so new combinators require extensions to its metatheory. In contrast,
proofs of correctness are built alongside functions in Narcissus, allowing the framework to be
safely augmented by including a proof justifying a new implementation strategy as part of an
extension.
We now present the complete details of Narcissus in amore bottom-up fashion, before discussing
our evaluation and a more detailed comparison with related work. The pieces described below are
contained in our code supplement, which may be helpful to consult while reading.
2 NARCISSUS, FORMALLY
We begin our ground-up explanation of Narcissus with the definition of the formats that capture
relationships between structured source values and their serialized representations. The signature
of a format from source type S to target type T is defined by a type alias:
FormatM S T Σ B Set of (S × Σ × T × Σ )
That is, a format is a quaternary relation on source values, initial states, target values, and final states.
Including states in the format allows us to specify a rich set of formats, including DNS packets. As
hinted at by theM suffix, FormatM can be interpreted as the composition of the nondeterminism
and stateful monads.
The format combinators showcased in Section 1.1 have straightforward definitions using standard
set operations. The ++ combinator sequences its subformats using a monoid operation · provided
by its target type.
(s, σ , t, σ ') ∈ format1 ++ format2 ≡
∃ t1 t2 σ ''. (s, σ , t1, σ '') ∈ format1 ∧ (s, σ '', t2, σ ') ∈ format2 ∧ t = t1 · t2
The function-composition combinator ◦ is actually defined via the more elementary⊚ combinator.
This combinator uses a relation, f, to format a projection of the source domain:
(s, σ , t, σ ') ∈ format ⊚ f ≡ ∃ s'. (s', σ , t, σ ') ∈ format ∧ f s s'
Underspecified formats can be built by combining ⊚ with a choice operator, as in the format for
unused words:
format_unused_word ≡ format_word ⊚ {(_, _) | True }
In addition to ◦ , ⊚ is used to define the ∩ combinator that restricts the source values included in
a format:
format ◦ f ≡ format ⊚ {(s, s') | s' = f s}
format ∩ P ≡ format ⊚ {(s, s') | P s ∧ s = s' }
7
Format Higher-order?
Booleans no
Peano Numbers no
Variable-Length List yes
Variable-Length String no
Option Type yes
Enumerated Types no
Format Higher-order?
Fixed-Length Words no
Unspecified BitString no
Fixed-Length List yes
Fixed-Length String no
Ascii Character no
Variant Types yes
Fig. 1. Formats for base types included in Narcissus.
Another helpful higher-order combinator isUnion, which is useful for defining formats with variant
encodings, e.g. Ethernet frames:
(s, σ , t, σ ') ∈ format1 ∪ format2 ≡ (s, σ , t, σ ') ∈ format1 ∨ (s, σ , t, σ ') ∈ format2
While not very useful for user-defined formats, the empty format ϵ , is helpful in the specifications
of encoder and decoder combinators:
(s, σ , t, σ ') ∈ ϵ ≡ t = ι ∧ σ= σ '
For clarity, we have presented these combinators in point-free style, but the monad formed by
FormatM also admits definitions in a pointed style, which can be more convenient for defining base
formats like format_reading. In addition to the standard return and bind (_← _; _) operators,
this monad includes a set-comprehension operator { x | P x }, which specifies a set via a defining
property P on possible return values. The three operators have straightforward interpretations as
sets [16]:
e ∈ return v ≡ e = v
e ∈ { x | P x } ≡ P e
e ∈ x← y; k x ≡ ∃ e'. e' ∈ y ∧ e ∈ k e'
As an example, we can specify the set of all possible locations of a period in a string s as:
s1 ← { s1 : String | ∃ s2 . s = s1 ++ "." ++ s2 }; return (length s1 )
ADT T {
Definition ι : T ;
Definition · : T→ T→ T ;
Definition snoc : T→ B→ T ;
Definition unfold : T→ option (B × T );
Axiom left_id : ∀ s1 , ι · s1 = s1 ;
Axiom right_id : ∀ s1 , s1 · ι = s1 ;
Axiom assoc : ∀ s1 s2 s3 , s1 · (s2 · s3 ) = (s1 · s2 ) · s3 ;
Axiom unfold_app : ∀ b s1 s2 s3 , unfold s1 = Some (b, s2 )
→ unfold (s1 · s3 ) = Some (b, s2 · s3 );
Axiom snoc_app : ∀ b s1 s2 ,
snoc b (s1 · s2 ) = s1 · (snoc b s2 );
Axiom unfd_snoc : ∀ b, unfold (snoc b ι ) = Some (b, ι );
Axiom unfd_id : unfold ι = None;
Axiom unfd_inj : ∀ s1 s2 , unfold s1 = unfold s2 → s1 = s2 }
Fig. 2. The ByteString interface, with some length op-
erations elided.
In addition to enabling users to define their
own formats in a familiar monadic style, the
nondeterminism monad integrates nicely with
Coq’s rewriting machinery when deriving cor-
rect encoders. Narcissus includes a library of
formats for the standard types listed in Figure 1,
most of which have pointed definitions.
We have left the definition of the target type
of our formats underspecified until now. Either
bitstrings or bytestrings, i.e. lists of bits or bytes,
would be natural choices, each with its own
advantages and disadvantages. Bitstrings have
a conceptually cleaner interface which allows
users to avoid byte alignment considerations.
As an example, the format in box 3.1 can sim-
ply sequence 14-bit and 2-bit words, while a
byte-aligned specification would require split-
ting the first word into 8- and 6-bit words, and
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combining the latter with the 2-bit word. Unfortunately, true bitstrings are quite removed from the
byte buffers used in real systems, requiring bit-shifting to enqueue bits one at a time. Narcissus
attempts to split the difference by using the bitstring abstract data type presented in Figure 2 for
the target type of formats. Clients can treat T as a bitstring equipped with operations governed by
algebraic laws for monoids and queues, while its actual representation type is closer to that of a
bytestring. Section 4 details how our derivation procedures optimize away uses of this interface in
order to produce more performant implementations.
2.1 Specifying Encoders and Decoders
These relational formats are not particularly useful by themselves— even checking whether a
format permits specific source and target values may be undecidable. Instead we use them to
specify the correctness of both encoders and decoders. So far, we have seen examples of relational
formats that permit one or many target representations of a particular source value, but in their
full generality, there might not be any valid encodings of some source value. As an extreme
example, consider the following use of the ∩ combinator to define an empty relation: {s | False}
∩ format_word. More realistically, a format for domain names must disallow strings with runs of
“.”, e.g. “www.foo..bar.com”. To account for formats that exclude some source values, Narcissus
encoders are partial functions from source to target values: EncodeM S T Σ B S→ Σ→ Option
(T × Σ ). At a high level, a format describes a family of permissible encoders, where each must
commit to a single target representation for each source value in the relation. More formally:
Definition 2.1 (Encoder Correctness). A correct encoder for a format format : FormatM S T Σ is a
partial function, encode : EncodeM S T Σ , that only produces encodings of source values included
in the format and produces an error on source values not included in the format:
∀s σ t σ ′. encode s σ = Some (t ,σ ′) → (s,σ , t ,σ ′) ∈ format∧
∀s σ . encode s σ = ⊥ → ∀t ′ σ ′. (s,σ , t ′,σ ′) < format.
In other words, a valid encoder refines a format; we henceforth use the notation format ⊇ encode
to denote that encode is a correct encoder for format.
Before stating the corresponding correctness definitions for decoders, consider the high-level
properties a correct decoder should satisfy, ignoring for now the question of state. Clearly, it must
be a sound left inverse of the format relation. That is, it should map every element t in the image of
s in format back to s: ∀s t . (s, t) ∈ format→ decode(t) = s. Less clear is how much conformance
checking a “correct” decoder should perform on target values that fall outside the image of format:
should decode fail on such inputs, or should its behavior be unconstrained in these cases? If these
decoders are being integrated into other formally verified systems that process decoded data further,
it is desirable to provide the strongest assurance about the integrity of decoded data to downstream
functions. On the other hand, there are valid reasons for looser standards, like sacrificing strict
format validation for efficiency, e.g. by not verifying checksums. For now, we require correct
decoders to flag strictly all malformed target values by signaling errors when applied to target
values not included in the relation: ∀s t , decode t = Some s → (s, t) ∈ format. As we shall see
later, our formulation will also support deriving decoders with more lenient validation policies.
However, we note that there are compelling security reasons for the top-level decoder to enforce
strict input validation, in order to cut off potential side channels via demonic choice between legal
alternatives. (E.g., consider a decoder integrated within an e-mail server, which decodes malformed
packets into the contents of other users’ inboxes.)
Looking at the signature of decoders in Narcissus,
DecodeM S T Σ B T→ Σ→ Option (S × Σ )
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we see that we need to adapt these notions of correctness to account for the state used by a decoder.
Whereas an encoder is a refinement of a format, and thus used identical types of state, we do not
force compatible decoders and formats to share the same type of state. To see why, consider a
simplified version of the format for DNS domain names [37], which keeps track of the locations of
previously formatted domains via its state argument:
Let format_domain (d: domain) (σ : domain→ word) B format_name d ∪ format_word (σ d)
This example uses an optional compression strategy in which a domain name can either be serialized
or replaced with a pointer to the location of a previously formatted occurrence. A decoder for
domains should also keep track of this information, in order to decode pointers:
Let decode_domain (t : T) (σ : word→ domain) B ...
In order for decode_domain to be correct, its state needs to “agree” with the state used to format its
input. We do not want to require that these states be equal, so that decoders can have the freedom
to use different data structures than the format, e.g. decode_domain could be implemented using a
BST sorted on words, while format_domain could use a prefix trie on domain names. Our notion of
decoder correctness captures agreement between different state types via a binary relation which
defines when format and decoder states are consistent. Hence our full notion of decoder correctness
accounts for both state and erroneous target values.
Definition 2.2 (Decoder Correctness). A correct decoder for a format, format : FormatM S T ΣE ,
and relation on states, ≈ : Set of (ΣE × ΣD ), is a function, decode : DecodeM S T ΣD , that, when
applied to a valid target value and initial state, produces a source value and final state similar to
one included in format, signaling an error otherwise:( ∀ (σE σE ': ΣE ) (σD :ΣD ) (s : S) (t : T).
(s, σE , t, σE ') ∈ format ∧ σE ≈ σD
→ ∃ σD '. decode t σD = Some (s, σD ')
∧ σE ' ≈ σD '
) ∧ ( ∀ (σE :ΣE ) (σD σD ':ΣD ) (s : S) (t: T).
σE ≈ σD ∧ decode t σD = Some (s, σD ')
→ ∃ σE '. (s, σE , t, σE ') ∈ format ∧ σE ' ≈ σD '
)
We denote that decode is a correct decoder for format under a similarity relation on states ≈ as
format ≈ decode.
By definition, it is impossible to find a correct decoder for a non-injective format. While decoders
and encoders have independent specifications of correctness, using a common format provides
a logical glue that connects the two. We can, in fact, prove the expected round-trip properties
between a correct encoder and correct decoder for a common format:
Theorem 2.3 (Decode Inverts Encode). Given a correct decoder format ≈ decode and
correct encoder format ⊇ encode for a common format format, decode is an inverse for encode when
restricted to source values in the format:
∀s σE t σ ′E σD . encode s σE = Some(t ,σ ′E ) ∧ σE ≈ σD → ∃σ ′D . decode t σD = Some(s,σ ′D)
Theorem 2.4 (Encode Inverts Decode). Given a correct decoder format ≈ decode and
correct encoder format ⊇ encode for a common format format, encode is defined for all decoded
source values produced by decode,
∀s σD t σ ′D σE . decode t σD = Some(s,σ ′D) ∧ σE ≈ σD → ∃t ′ σ ′E . encode s σE = Some(t ′,σ ′E )
That encode is an inverse of decode for source values with unique encodings is a direct corollary
of Theorem 2.4.
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format1 ⊇ encode1 format2 ⊇ encode2
∀ (s, σ , t1, σ ') ∈ format1 .∀ t' σ ''. (s, σ ', t', σ '') ∈ format2 →
∃ t1 ' σ2 t2 ' σ3 . encode1 s σ= Some (t1 ', σ2 )∧ encode2 s σ2 = Some (t2 ', σ3 )
format1 ++ format2 ⊇ λs. t1 ← encode1 s; t2 ← encode2 s; return (t1 · t2 )
(EncSeq)
format ⊇ encode
format ◦ g ⊇ encode ◦ g (EncComp)
format ⊇ encode ∀ s. p s = true ↔ s ∈ P
P ∩ format ⊇ λs. if p s then encode s else fail (EncRest)
ϵ ⊇ λs. return ι (EncEmpty)
format1 ⊇ encode1 format2 ⊇ encode2
∀ (s, σ , t, σ ') ∈ formati. n s = i
format1 ∪ format2 ⊇ λs. j← n s; encodejs
(EncUnion)
Fig. 3. Correctness rules for encoder combinators.
3 DERIVING ENCODERS AND DECODERS
Equipped with precise notions of correctness, we can now define how we derive provably cor-
rect encoders and decoders from a format. These functions will be byte-aligned in a subsequent
derivation step presented in Section 3.2. We begin with encoders, since they often have similar
structure to their corresponding formats. Intuitively, such a derivation is simply the search for a
pair of an encoder function encode and a proof term witnessing that it is correct with respect to a
format: format ⊇ encode. As an example, a proof that a function which returns an empty bytestring
correctly implements the empty format can also be read as evidence that it is safe to choose this
implementation when searching for an encoder for ϵ . In this light, lemmas like enc_readingCorrect
which prove that encoder combinators are correct can be interpreted as derivation rules for con-
structing such proof trees from goal formats.
Leveraging this intuition, we denote these lemmas using standard inference-rule notation:
Lemma EncA (h1 : H1 ) (h2 : H2 )
: CorrectEncoder A T Σ formatAencodeA.
≡ H1 H2
formatA ⊇ encodeA
(EncA)
Figure 3 presents the encoder combinators for the formats from Section 2 using this inference-rule
style. EncUnion is an example of an encoder that commits to a particular target value– given a
correct encoder for each format in the union, it relies on an index function n on source values to
commit to a particular encoding strategy, with the second hypothesis of the rule ensuring that this
index function correctly picks a format that includes the source value. The rule for ++ proves that
a correct encoder for sequences can be built from encoders for its subformats. This rule features
a wrinkle concerning state: in order to apply EncSeq correctly, if the format1 produces some
intermediate state that makes format2 (and thus format1 ++ format2 ) nonempty, encode1 must
also produce a state on which encode2 returns some value. The last hypothesis of EncSeq enforces
that encode1 does not “mislead” encode2 in this manner.
By combining EncSeq and EncComp with the rules for base types, e.g. EncWord, we can
iteratively derive correct encoders from a format; Figure 4 presents an example of such a derivation
for one of the encoders from our introductory tour. Each step in the derivation corresponds to the
encoder that results from applying EncSeq and an encoder-derivation rule for the topmost format.
The proofs that none of the encoders pass on misleading states are elided. The hole □ at each step
corresponds to the encoder that is built at the next step; recursively filling these in and simplifying
the resulting expression with the monad laws yields the expected encoder for enc_data.
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format_word ◦ stationId
++ format_unused_word 8
++ format_nat 8 ◦ length ◦ data
++ format_list format_word ◦ data
⊇ λ s⇒ t1 ← encode_word s.stationId;t2 ←□;
ret (t1 · t2)
⇑EncSeq + EncUWord
format_unused_word 8
++ format_nat 8 ◦ length ◦ data
++ format_list format_word ◦ data
⊇ λ s⇒ t2 ← encode_word 0b00000000;t3 ←□;
ret (t2 · t3)⇑EncSeq + EncNat
format_nat 8 ◦ length ◦ data
++ format_list format_word ◦ data ⊇
λ s⇒ t3 ← encode_nat (length s.data);
t4 ←□;
ret (t3 · t4)⇑EncSeq + EncList
format_list format_word ◦ data ⊇ λ s⇒ ret (encode_list encode_word s.data)
Fig. 4. An example encoder derivation.
3.1 Decoders
Before defining similar correctness rules for decoder combinators, we pause to consider how they
are used to build a top-level decoder. In particular, consider what the decoder combinators used to
build a reusable decoder for ++ should look like:
format1 ++ format2 ≈ decode1 >>= decode2
The natural way to decode the value resulting from sequencing format1 and format2 is to have
decode1 return any unconsumed portion of the target value for decode2 to finish processing. We
thus define the signature of a decoder combinator to be:
DecodeCM V T Σ B T→ Σ→ Option (V × T × Σ )
The change of the name of the first type parameter also suggests a more subtle difference between
intermediate and top-level decoders, in that the former return partial projections or views of source
values used to produce the target inputs. Unfortunately, neither of these changes align with our
earlier notion of decoder correctness, which expects a decoder to recover the full source value by
completely consuming a target value. To recover the desired top-level property, we first adapt our
two correctness properties to account for these differences. To concretize this discussion, consider
how we might justify the use of decode_word in the following decoder correctness fact.
format_word ◦ stationId
++ format_word ◦ data ≈
id← decode_word;
d← decode_word;
return { stationId B sid; data B d }
The first and second uses of decode_word compute projections of the original sensor value, stationId
and data, respectively. In addition, note that each combinator can only validate that its target value
is consistent with its view of the data, not the full source value. Finally, in order to be sequenced
correctly, a combinator needs to consume precisely the portion of the bitstring corresponding
to its projection. In order to account for the first two concerns, our adaptation of the soundness
(left-inverse) criterion for decoder combinators is parameterized over a binary relation on source
and projected values representing a view, as well as an additional format capturing the conformance
checking performed by the decoder.
Definition 3.1 (Decoder Combinator Soundness). A sound decoder combinator for a source format,
formats : FormatM S T ΣE , relation on states, ≈ : Set of (ΣE × ΣD ), view view : S→ V→ Prop,
and conformance format, formatv: FormatM V T ΣE is a function, decode : DecodeCM V T ΣD ,
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that when applied to a valid target value appended to an arbitrary bitstring and initial state, produces
a view of the source value that agrees with the conformance format while consuming exactly the
portion of the target value in the source format:
∀ (σE σE ': ΣE ) (σD :ΣD ) (s : S) (t t': T). (s, σE , t, σE ') ∈ formats∧ σE ≈ σD
→ ∃ v σD '. decode (t · t') σD = Some (v, t', σD ') ∧
view s v ∧ (v, σD , t, σD ') ∈ formatv∧ σE ' ≈ σD '
To see why combinators are required to be oblivious to tails of bitstrings, consider a simple
format for card suits which uses unit for the state type (we elide the trivial state values below):
format_suit ≡ {(♣, 0b11), (♦, 0b0), (♥, 0b1), (♠, 0b10)}
To format a pair of cards, we could format each card in sequence: format_suit◦ fst ++ format_suit
◦ snd. This format is clearly not injective, as it is not possible to distinguish between the encodings
of (♣, ♦) and (♥, ♠). Absent additional information in the surrounding format, e.g. a Boolean flag
identifying the color of the suit being decoded, it is impossible for a combinator for format_suit to
identify soundly how much of the target to process. Since this format lacks such information, it is
imposible to find a correct top-level decoder for it.
Adapting the conformance-checking criterion for decoder combinators is more straightforward.
Absent a complete view of the original source value, a combinator will be unable to ensure adherence
to the original format, but it can ensure that any computed value agrees with the provided view
format relation and is a consistent view of any source values in the original format with the same
encoding:
Definition 3.2 (Decoder Combinator Consistency). A consistent decoder combinator for a source
format, formats : FormatM S T ΣE , conformance format, formatv: FormatM V T ΣE , relation on
states, ≈ : Set of (ΣE × ΣD ), view view : S→ V→ Prop, is a function, decode : DecodeCM V T
ΣD , that is guaranteed to produce a view and unconsumed bitstring in a manner consistent with
the conformance format:
∀ (σE :ΣE ) (σD σD ':ΣD ) (v : V) (t t': T). σE ≈ σD ∧ decode t σD = Some (v, t', σD ')
→ ∃ t'' σE '. t = t'' · t' ∧ (v, σE , t'', σE ') ∈ formatv∧ σE ' ≈ σD '
∧ ∀ s. (s, σE , t'', σE ') ∈ formats→ view s v
A correct decoder combinator is one that is both sound with respect to the source format and a view
v and that is consistent with its conformance format. We denote this property as formats ≈ v
decode ∼ formatv. Note that choosing the equality relation as the view and the original format as
the conformance format yields a property equivalent to our original left-inverse criterion, which we
continue to denote as ≈ . Similarly, choosing the relation {(s, v) | True} as the conformance
format permits the decoder to return any value when applied to a malformed input.
Figure 5 presents a selection of some (strict) decoder combinator correctness theorems included
in Narcissus as inference rules. Note that all three rules are parameterized over a predicate P
which restricts the source format P ∩ format. This predicate is key to our approach to the modular
verification of decoder combinators: each of these proofs use this predicate to thread information
about previously decoded data through a proof of correctness for a composite decoder. Such
information is necessary for a decoder combinator whose correctness depends on context in which
it is used. As a concrete example, the decode_list combinator in DecList only correctly decodes
lists of length n, a restriction enforced by the second assumption of the rule. In isolation this rule
only justifies using decode_list to decode fixed-lengths lists. When used as part of a larger format
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Q ∩ format ≈ decode
∀l. P l→|l |=n∧∀a∈ l.Q a
P ∩ format_list format ≈ decode_list decode n
(DecList)
∀s′. P s′ → s = s′
b=true↔ P s
P ∩ ϵ ≈ if b then return s else fail
(DecDone)
Q ∩ format1 ≈ decode1 ∀s. P s → Q (f s)
∀v. {s | P s ∧ f s = v} ∩ format2 ≈ decode2 v
P ∩ format1 ◦ f ++ format2 ≈ decode1 >>= decode2
(DecSeqProj)
Fig. 5. Selected correctness rules for decoder combinators.
that also includes the length of the original list, however, it can be applied to lists of variable length,
as in box 7.1. At first glance, the DecDone rule seems even more limited, as it only applies to a
format with a single, unique source value. In the context of a larger format, however, this rule
becomes much more powerful, particularly when employing these rules to derive a decode from a
format specification.
To see how, consider how the source predicate evolves during the decoder derivation presented
in Figure 6. Each intermediate node in this derivation corresponds to the format in the last premise
of DecSeqProj. Note how each step introduces a variable for the newly parsed data, and how
an additional constraint is added to P relating the original source value to this value. When the
derivation reaches format_list, this constraint witnesses that the number of elements in that list
is known. Similarly, although the format is empty at the topmost leaf of the derivation tree, P
includes enough constraints to uniquely recover the original source value, and DecDone can be
applied to finish the derivation. The first premise of DecDone ensures that the restriction on source
values is sufficient to prove the existence of some constant s that is equal to the original source
value. The second premise of DecDone ensures that a derived decoder is not overly permissive in
the case that P is too restrictive. As previously noted, a format could encode the same view of a
source value twice, and the consistency of the corresponding decoded values should be validated
during decoding. Thus, the function b in this premise acts as a decision procedure that validates
the consistency of all the projections of the original source gathered during decoding. While this
example is straightforward, similar dependencies can be found in many existing binary formats, in
the form of tags for sum types, version numbers, and checksum fields. In each case, the correctness
of a combinator for a particular subformat depends on a previously decoded value.
DecCompose and DecDone can actually be derived from the more general set of rules found
in Figure 7. While these rules are mostly helpful for proving more specific rules which are more
useful in derivations, each demonstrates some interesting feature of our formulation of correctness
for decoder combinators:
• DecCompose proves how to correctly decode projections of the source value. This rule
requires the use of the more general correctness statement, as decode can only recover the
view of the source value it has access to.
• DecInj proves how to safely transform a projected value, and must update the conformance
format to reflect that a transformation has been applied. While not particularly helpful during
derivations, this rule is useful for proving other derivation rules.
• DecViewDone generalizesDecDone to arbitrary views of a source value. The second premise
corresponds to the decision procedure from DecDone— an empty conformance format is one
consequence of the source value projections gathered during decoding being inconsistent.
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{s | length s.data < 28 } ∩
©­­­­«
format_word ◦ stationId
++ format_unused_word 8
++ format_nat 8 ◦ length ◦ data
++ format_list format_word ◦ data
++ ϵ
ª®®®®¬⇑DecSeqProj + DecWord
{s | length s.data < 28
∧ s.stationId = w} ∩
©­­«
format_unused_word 8
++ format_nat 8 ◦ length ◦ data
++ format_list format_word ◦ data
++ ϵ
ª®®¬⇑DecSeqUn + DecWord
{s | length s.data < 28
∧ s.stationId = w} ∩
©­«
format_nat 8 ◦ length ◦ data
++ format_list format_word ◦ data
++ ϵ
ª®¬⇑DecSeqProj + DecNat
{s | length s.data < 28
∧ s.stationId = w
∧ length s.data = ln}
∩ ( format_list format_word ◦ data)
⇑DecSeqProj + DecList
{s | length s.data < 28 ∧ s.stationId = w
∧ length s.data = ln ∧ s.data = l} ∩
(
ϵ
)
Fig. 6. An example of constraints added to a format during a decoder derivation.
• DecSeq is a mostly straightforward generalization of DecSeqProj, with the important tweak
that it builds a decoder that constructs a pair of the views produced by its subdecoders. Com-
posing this rule with DecInj justifies the correctness of combinators that drop intermediate
views, e.g. DecSeqProj.
• DecUnion is similar to UnionEnc, with the key difference being that it requires a boolean
value, b, indicating which format produced the current bitstring. The combinator uses a
decoder, decodeB, to compute this value, and uses a conformance check on the result of that
decoder to ensure the boolean flag is correct. In addition, the proof of correctness for decodeB
only requires that it consume some prefix of the current format, giving it the freedom to
return as soon as it can identify which subformat was used to generate the current source
value. Framing the problem in this way allows Narcissus to leverage other derivation rules to
build this function. We will see another example of this paradigm in the rule for IP checksums
presented in Section 5.
3.2 Improving Performance of Encoders and Decoders
The encoders and decoders derived via our combinator rules utilize the same bitstring abstract data
type as format specifications, employing the bitstring’s snoc and unfold operations to enqueue
and dequeue individual bits. Operating at the bit-level imposes a large performance hit on these
functions, since implementing these methods on the fixed-length byte buffers typically used for the
target data type requires bitshifts. Converting encoders and decoders to use byte-level operations
greatly improves the performance of these functions, to the point that they can be competitive
with hand-implemented implementations, as our evaluation in Section 6 will show. In order to do
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Q ∩ formats ≈ decode
∀s v. ρ s v ∧ P s → Q v
P ∩ formats⊚ ρ ≈ ρdecode ∼ formatv∩ Q
(DecCompose)
∀s. P s → ρ s v
∀σ . (v, σ , ι , σ )∈formatv
P ∩ ϵ ≈ ρ return v ∼ formatv
(DecViewDone)
P ∩ formats ≈ ρdecode ∼ formatv
∀s v. ρ s v ∧ P s → ρ s (f v)
P ∩ formats ≈ ρ fmap f decode ∼ formatv⊚ f
(DecInject)
P ∩ format1 ≈ ρ1decode1 ∼ formatv1 ∀s v1 v2 . ρ3 s (v1 ,v2) ↔ ρ1 s v1 ∧ ρ2 s v2
∀v. {s | P s ∧ ρ s v} ∩ format2 ≈ ρ2decode2 v ∼ formatv2 v
P ∩ format1 ++ format2 ≈ ρ3v1 ← decode1 ; v2 ← decode2 ; return (v1 , v2 ) ∼ formatv1++ formatv2
(DecSeq)
P∩ formatT ≈ ρdecodeT ∼ formatvT P∩ formatE ≈ ρdecodeE ∼ formatvE
P∩ subformat ≈ ρBdecodeB ∼
{(b, σ , t, σ ′) |∀s t′ σ ′′.
(s, σ , t++t′, σ ′′) ∈ formatT → b=true
∧ (s, σ , t++t′, σ ′′) ∈ formatE → b=false
}
subformat ≤ (format1 ∪ format2)
P ∩ (formatT ∪ formatE) ≈ ρλt. b← decode_B; if b then decodeT else decode_E ∼ formatvT ∪ formatvE
(DecUnion)
Fig. 7. Additional decoder combinator correctness rules.
so without compromising our correct-by-construction guarantee, we will justify this conversion
using an equivalence between bit-aligned and byte-aligned functions.
The signatures of the byte-aligned functions instantiate the target type of their bit-aligned
versions to a byte buffer of fixed length n:
AlignEncodeM S (n : nat) Σ B S→ ByteBuff n→ nat→ Σ→ Option (ByteBuff n × nat × Σ )
AlignDecodeM S (n : nat) Σ B ByteBuff n→ nat→ Σ→ Option (S × nat × Σ )
In addition to fixing the target type, byte-aligned encoders now take the bytebuffer they write to,
and both functions now carry the index of the next byte to read/write. Both functions are instances
of the state and error monads, although we force AlignDecodeM to be read-only by threading the
byte buffer through the reader monad. We equip AlignEncodeM with a SetCurrentByte operation
that sets the byte at the current index while updating that index, and AlignDecodeM with a
corresponding GetCurrentByte operation for dequeuing bytes. We define the twin equivalences
used to justify the correctness of byte-optimized functions as follows:
Definition 3.3 (Correctness of Byte-Aligned Encoders). A byte-aligned encoder encode_bytes and
bit-aligned encoder encode_bits are equivalent, encode_bits ≃ encode_bytes, iff:
• encode_bytes encodes the same bit sequence at the beginning of its byte buffer as encode_bits.
• encode_bytes fails when encode_bitswould write past the end of the fixed-length byte buffer.
• encode_bytes fails whenever encode_bits does.
Definition 3.4 (Correctness of Byte-Aligned Decoders). A byte-aligned decoder decode_bytes and
bit-aligned decoder decode_bits are equivalent, decode_bytes ⋍ decode_bytes, iff:
• decode_bytes produces the same value as decode_bits, while consuming the same number
of bits.
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decode_bits1 ⋍ decode_bytes1 ∀v. decode_bits2 v ⋍ decode_bytes2v
decode_bits1>>=decode_bits2 ⋍ decode_bytes1>>=decode_bytes2
(AlignDecSeq)
throw ⋍ throw
(AlignDecThrow)
decode_word8 ⋍ GetCurrentByte
(AlignDecByte)
return a ⋍ return a
(AlignDecReturn)
Fig. 8. A selection of byte-alignment rules for decoders.
• decode_bytes fails when decode_bitswould write past the end of the fixed-length byte buffer.
• decode_bytes fails whenever decode_bits does.
Armed with these definitions, we can build transformation rules for deriving correct byte-
aligned implementations from bit-aligned functions in a similar manner to the previous section.
Figure 8 gives examples of the rules for byte-aligning decoders, the most important of these is
the AlignDecSeq which establishes that the byte-alignment transformation can be decomposed
through sequences. The rules for byte-aligned encoders are similar. Note how AlignDecByte
proves an equivalence between dequeuing an 8-bit word and AlignDecodeM’s GetCurrentByte
operation. A key part of automating derivations using these rules is associating sequences of
bit-aligned decoders so that this rule applies, as the next section discusses in more detail.
4 AUTOMATING DERIVATIONS
As illustrated in Section 1.1, Narcissus provides a set of tactics to help automate the derivations
described above. The tactic derive_encoder_decoder_pair presented in that tour is actually
implemented via a pair of proof-automation tactics, DeriveEncoder and DeriveDecoder, that de-
rive encoders and decoders, respectively. Algorithm 1 presents the pseudocode algorithm for
DeriveDecoder; DeriveEncoder has a similar implementation. In addition to the top-level format,
fmt , this tactic takes as input libraries of decoder-derivation and byte-alignement rules, drules and
arules, which allow the tactic to be extended to support new formats. DeriveDecoder first converts
the input format to a normal form by right associating sequences and collapsing nested applications
of the format-composition operator ⊚ . Next, the tactic attempts to derive a bit-aligned decoder
for fmt via the ApplyRules subroutine that recursively applies the derivation rules in drules. If a
bit-level decoder is found, the algorithm again normalizes the result using the monad laws and
attempts to derive a byte-aligned decoder by calling the AlignDecoder subroutine. Before diving
into the details of the ApplyRules and AlignDecoder tactics, we emphasize that DeriveDecoder is
interactive: if it gets stuck on a goal it cannot solve with the current rule libraries, it presents that
goal to the user to solve interactively, as in the derivation in box 5.1.
K ∈Cont ≜ DecodeM Si T→ DecodeM S T
rule ∈FormatM S T↛ ⟨FormatM Si T,Cont⟩
In the implementation of ApplyRules, derivation rules are implemented as tactics that apply cor-
rectness lemmas to decompose the current CorrectDecoder goal into a set of simpler subgoals in
the standard interactive proof style. Conceptually, ApplyRules treats its derivation rules as partial
functions, each mapping a format to a triple of a (possibly empty) set of subformats, a set of
side conditions, and a continuation K that can construct a bit-aligned decoder from bit-aligned
decoders for those subformats, when those side conditions are satisfied. The subformats represent
the ≈ premises of each derivation rule, the side conditions capture its other premises, and the
continuation is the decoder in its conclusion. Thus, DecSeqProj from Figure 5 can be thought of as
a function that returns the subformats Q ∩ fmt1 and {s | f s = s′ ∧ P} ∩ fmt2, the side conditions
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Algorithm 1 Derive a byte-aligned decoder from a format
1: function DeriveDecoder(fmt , drules, arules)
Input: fmt : a format relation
drules: set of decoder combinators derivation rules
arules: set of byte-alignment transformation rules
Output: dec: a byte-aligned decoder inverting fmt
2: fmt0 ← NormalizeFormat(fmt)
3: dec ← ApplyRules(fmt0, drules)
4: dec0 ← NormalizeDecoder(dec)
5: AlignDecoder(dec0, arules)
6: function AlignDecoder(dec, arules)
7: for rule ← arules do
8: try
9: dec0 ← DecAssoc(dec)
10: ⟨dec,K⟩ ← rule(dec)
11: dec ← AlignDecoder(dec, rules)
12: return K(dec)
1: function ApplyRules(fmt , drules)
2: try
3: FinishDecoder(fmt)
4: for rule ← drules do
5: try
6: ⟨fmt , P ,K⟩ ← rule(fmt)
7: dec ← ApplyRules(fmt , rules)
8: if SolveSideConditions(P) then
9: return K(dec)
10: function FinishDecoder(fmt)
11: try
12: ⟨∅, (PsrcPdec),K⟩ ← DecDone(fmt)
13: s ← ExtractView(Psrc )
14: b ← DecidePredicate(Pdec )
15: return if b then return s else fail
∀s. P s → Q (f s), and the continuation λd1d2.d1++ D d2, when applied to a format of the form
P ∩ fmt1 ◦ f++ fmt2. A rule can fail when the format in its conclusion does not match the current
goal, when its CorrectDecoder subformats cannot be decoded, or when its side conditions are
not satisfied, e.g. DecList fails when an appropriate length cannot identified. ApplyRules first
attempts to solve the goal completely via the FinishDecoder tactic, which we will discuss shortly.
H1 : length s.data < 2
8 ∧ s.stationId = w
∧ length s.data = ln ∧ s.data = l
□s = s
Decompose (“destruct”) the source value, s, with
new variables for field values.
H1 : length s.data < 2
8 ∧ x1 = w
∧ length x2 = ln ∧ x2 = l
□s = { stationId := x1 ; data := x2 }
Substitute with equalities from source restriction
(hypothesis H1).
H1 : length s.data < 2
8
□s = { stationId := w; data := l }
Variant of “reflexivity” solves the goal.
Fig. 9. Example Ltac reconstruction of the original
source value at the end of the derivation in Figure 6.
If that tactic fails to find an appropriate decoder,
the algorithm iteratively attempts to apply the
available rules to the current format, starting
with rules for base formats. If a rule is success-
fully applied, the algorithm recursively calls
ApplyRules to derive decoders for any gener-
ated subformats. If those derivations are suc-
cessful, the algorithm applies the continuation
to the results and returns a finished decoder. If a
recursive call fails to process a subformat com-
pletely, the tactic pauses and returns the corre-
sponding CorrectDecoder subgoal, so that the
user can see where the automation got stuck.
AlignDecoder is algorithmically similar to Ap-
plyRules, with the important modification that
it attempts to reassociate the topmost decoder
using the DecAssoc tactic before applying its
transformation rules.
The FinishDecoder tactic warrants special
discussion. FinishDecoder attempts to finish a
derivation of a complete source value by finding
instantiations of the s and b metavariables in
the DecDone rule. Importantly, the original
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source value cannot be used for either, but must
instead be instantiatedwith values that only use
previously parsed data. Automatically finding
an instance of s is particularly worrisome, as it is well-known that Ltac, Coq’s proof-automation
language, does not provide good support for introspecting into definitions of inductive types, and
we would like to use Ltac to construct records of fairly arbitrary types, without relying on OCaml
plugins. Thankfully, a combination of standard tactics for case analysis and rewriting are up to the
task.
Let us see how the ExtractView tactic attempts to discharge the first proof obligation of DecDone
for the derivation from the previous section, which is presented in Figure 9. This figure denotes the
unknown existential variable representing s as □s. ExtractView first uses Coq’s standard destruct
tactic to perform case analysis on s, generating the second subgoal presented in Figure 9, with
occurrences of s replaced by its constructor applied to new variables x1, x2, and x3. ExtractView then
attempts to remove any variables that are not in the scope of the existential variable by rewriting
the current goal using any equalities about the original source value available in the context. The
resulting final goal equates □s to previously decoded values and can be solved by unifying the
two sides via the reflexivity tactic. Importantly, since s was not available when □s was quantified,
this final tactic only succeeds when the rewritten term depends solely on previously decoded data.
FinishDecoder then attempts to solve a similar goal with a hole for b using the DecidePredicate
tactic that employs known decision procedures and simplifies away any tautologies, relying on
a special typeclass to resolve any user-defined predicates. We pause here to reemphasize while
FinishDecoder relies on heuristic-based proof automation in a best effort attempt to solve the goal
and is thus incomplete, the failure of a tactic does not necessarily spell the end of a derivation. By
virtue of being implemented in an interactive proof assistant, Narcissus can loop users in when
a derivation gets stuck: if FinishDecoder cannot find a decoder for the empty format, the user is
presented a subgoal like the one at the top of Figure 9, so that they can attempt to solve the subgoal
interactively.
5 EXTENDING THE FRAMEWORK
As outlined in Section 1.1, an extension to Narcissus consists of four pieces: a format, encoder
and decoder combinators, derivation rules, and automation for incorporating these rules into
DeriveEncoder and DeriveDecoder. As a concrete example, consider the format of the Internet
Protocol (IP) checksum used in the IP headers, TCP segments, and UDP datagrams featured in our
case studies. Figure 10 presents the format, decoder combinator, and decoder derivation rule needed
for Narcissus to support IP checksums. IP_Checksum_format is a higher-order combinator in the
spirit of ++ ; the key difference is that it uses the bitstrings produced by its subformat parameters to
build the IP checksum (the one’s complement of the bitstrings interpreted as lists of bytes), which it
inserts between the two encoded values to produce the output bitstring. The IP_Checksum_decode
combinator has two subdecoder parameters: it uses the first to calculate the number of bytes
included in the checksum, and then validates the checksum before decoding the rest of the string
using its second parameter. The derivation rule for this format guarantees that, when given the
correct number of bytes to include in the checksum, this test will always succeed for uncorrupted
data and that it can avoid parsing the rest of the input otherwise. Figure 11 presents a complete
example of this checksum combinator being used to derive encoders and decoders for IP headers.
Figure 11 also includes a complete example of a new decoder derivation tactic, which implements
the DecChkSum rule presented in Figure 10. DecChkSum is similar to DecSeqProj, with a couple
of key additional assumptions. The first four of these ensure the bytestrings produced by each
subformat have constant length and are properly byte-aligned, which is needed to prove the validity
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Let IP_Checksum_format {S} format1 format2 (s : S) := λ ctx⇒
‘(p, ctx)← format1 s ctx;
‘(q, ctx)← format2 s (addE ctx 16);
c← { c : word 16 | ∀ ext,
IPChecksum_Valid (bin_measure (p ++ (encode_word c) ++ q))
(p ++ (encode_word c) ++ q ++ ext) };
ret (p ++ (encode_word c) ++ q, ctx).
Let IP_Checksum_decode (bin : B) (env : CacheDecode) :=
‘(n, _, _)← decode_measure bin env;
if checksum_Valid_dec (n * 8) bin then decodeA bin env
else None
∀(s,σE , t ,σ ′E ) ∈ fmt1 → length t = len1 s ∀s.len1 s mod 8 = 0∀(s,σE , t ,σ ′E ) ∈ fmt2 → length t = len2 s ∀s.len2 s mod 8 = 0
P ∩ fmt1 ++ format_unused_word 16 ++ fmt2 ≈ decP
P ∩ subformat ≈{(s, n) | len1s + 16 + len2s = n × 8}decM formatM
subformat ≤ (fmt1 ++ format_unused_word16 ++ fmt2)
P ∩ IP_Checksum_format fmt1 fmt2 ≈ IP_Checksum_decode decM decP
(DecChkSum)
Fig. 10. Format, decoder, and decoder combinator for IP Checksums.
of the initial checksum test. More interesting is the last assumption, which uses a decoder to
calculate the number of bytes to include in the checksum. As with the DecUnion rule from Figure 7,
this framing allows ApplyRules to recursively discharge this condition during a derivation. The
apply_new_combinator_rule tactic applies this rule for IP checksums, and attempts to discharge
the first four assumptions by using a database of facts about the lengths of encoded datatypes and
the modulus operator, relying on ApplyRules to derive decoders for the subformats. Note that this
tactic is a realization of the logic of the body of ApplyRules’s loop, deriving subdecoders recursively
while discharging other subgoals immediately. Other derivation rules included in Narcissus have
similar implementations.
6 EVALUATION
To evaluate the expressiveness and real-world applicability of Narcissus, we wrote specifications
and derived implementations of encoders and decoders for five of the most commonly used packet
formats of the Internet protocol suite: Ethernet, ARP, IPv4, TCP, UDP. These formats were chosen
to cover the full TCP/IP stack while offering a wide variety of interesting features and challenges:
Checksums. An IPv4 packet header contains a checksum equal to the one’s-complement sum of
the 16-bit words resulting from encoding all other fields of the header.
Pseudoheaders. TCP and UDP segments also contain checksums, but they are computed on a
segment’s payload prefixed by a pseudoheader that incorporates information from the IP layer.
This pseudoheader is not present in the encoded packet.
Unions. An Ethernet frame header contains a 16-bit EtherType field, encoding either the length of
the frame’s payload (up to 1500 bytes) or a constant indicating which protocol the frame’s payload
encapsulates. The two interpretations were originally conflicting, but the ambiguity was resolved
in IEEE 802.3x-1997 by requiring all EtherType constants to be above 1535. This dichotomy is
easily expressed in Narcissus as a union format.
20
Record IPv4_Packet :=
{ TotalLength: word 16; ID: word 16;
DF: B; MF: B; FragmentOffset: word 13; TTL: word 8;
Protocol: EnumType ["ICMP"; "TCP"; "UDP"];
SourceAddress: word 32; DestAddress: word 32;
Options: list (word 32) }.
Definition ProtocolTypeCodes := (* Protocol Numbers from [RFC5237 ] *)
[0b00000001 (* ICMP: 1 *); 0b00000110 (* TCP: 6 *); 0b00010001 (* UDP: 17 *)].
Definition IPv4_Packet_Format : FormatM IPv4_Packet ByteString :=
(format_nat 4 ◦ (constant 4)
++ format_nat 4 ◦ (plus 5) ◦ @length _ ◦ Options
++ format_unused_word 8 (* TOS Field! *)
++ format_word ◦ TotalLength
++ format_word ◦ ID
++ format_unused_word 1 (* Unused flag! *)
++ format_bool ◦ DF
++ format_bool ◦ MF
++ format_word ◦ FragmentOffset
++ format_word ◦ TTL
++ format_enum ProtocolTypeCodes ◦ Protocol)
ThenChecksum IPChecksum_Valid OfSize 16 ThenCarryOn
(format_word ◦ SourceAddress
++ format_word ◦ DestAddress
++ format_list format_word ◦ Options).
Definition IPv4_Packet_OK (ipv4 : IPv4_Packet) :=
(length ipv4 .(Options)) < 11 ∧
20 + 4 * (length ipv4 .(Options)) < wordToNat ipv4 .(TotalLength).
Ltac new_encoder_rules ::=
match goal with
⊢ CorrectAlignedEncoder (_ ThenChecksum _ OfSize _ ThenCarryOn _) _⇒
eapply @CorrectAlignedEncoderForIPChecksumThenC
end.
Ltac apply_new_combinator_rule ::=
match goal with
| H : cache_inv_Property ?mnd _
⊢ CorrectDecoder _ _ _ _ (?fmt1 ThenChecksum _ OfSize _ ThenCarryOn ?fmt2 ) _ _ _⇒
eapply compose_IPChecksum_format_correct’ with (format1 := fmt1 );
[ exact H | repeat calculate_length_ByteString | repeat calculate_length_ByteString
| solve_mod_8 | solve_mod_8 | intros; normalize_format; apply_rules
| normalize_format; apply_rules | solve_Prefix_Format ]
end.
Let enc_dec : EncoderDecoderPair IPv4_Packet_Format IPv4_Packet_OK.
Proof. derive_encoder_decoder_pair. Defined.
Let IPv4_encoder := encoder_impl enc_dec.
Let IPv4_decoder := decoder_impl enc_dec.
Fig. 11. Format for IP version 4 headers, using the IP Checksum format.
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Constraints and underspecification. TCP, UDP, and IP headers include underspecified or reserved-
for-future-use bits, as well as fields with interdependencies (for example, the 16-bit urgent-pointer
field of a TCP packet is only meaningful if its URG flag is set, and the options of a TCP packet
mush be zero-padded to a 32-bit boundary equal to that specified by the packet’s data-offset field).
The specifications of these formats are short and readable: new formats typically requires 10 to
20 lines of declarative serialization code and 10 to 20 lines of record-type, enumerated-type, and
numeric-constant declarations. In addition to the base set of formats, these specifications leverage a
few TCP/IP-specific extensions including checksums, pseudoheader checksums, and custom index
functions for union types.
The decoders that our framework produces are reasonably efficient and sufficiently full-featured
to be used as drop-in replacements for all encoding and decoding components of a typical TCP/IP
stack. In the rest of this section, we describe our extraction methodology and support our claims by
presenting performance benchmarks and reporting on a fork of the native-OCaml mirage-tcpip
library used in the MirageOS unikernel, rewired to use our code to parse and decode network
packets. We use Coq’s extraction mechanism to obtain a standalone OCaml library, using OCaml’s
integers to represent machine words and natural numbers, a native-code checksum implementation,
and custom array data structures for the bytestrings and vectors that encoders and decoders operate
on. These custom data structures, as well as a subset of the rewrite rules used during the final
byte-alignment phase, are unverified and thus part of our trusted base.
6.1 Benchmarking
ARP request
  encode (42b)
  decode (42b)
ARP response
  encode (42b)
  decode (42b)
HTTP request
  encode (141b)
  decode (141b)
HTTP response
  encode (372b)
  decode (372b)
NTP request
  encode (90b)
  decode (90b)
NTP response
  encode (90b)
  decode (90b)
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5
Single-packet processing time (µs)
Ethernet
ARP
IPv4
TCP
UDP
Fig. 12. Processing times for various network packets on an Intel
Core i7-4810MQ CPU @ 2.80GHz. Each row shows how each
layer of the network stack contributes to encoding and decoding
times. TCP and UDP checksums are computed over the entirety
of the packet, payload included, which explains the higher pro-
cessing times. The HTTP and ARP payloads are a GET request
to http://nytimes.com and a clock-synchronization request to
time.nist.gov.
Figure 12 shows single-packet encod-
ing and decoding times, estimated
by linearly regressing over the time
needed to run batches of n packet se-
rializations or deserializations for in-
creasingly large values of n (complete
experimental data, including 95% con-
fidence intervals, are provided as sup-
plementary material; they were ob-
tained using the Core_bench OCaml
library [24]).
6.2 Mirage OS Integration
MirageOS [33] is a “library operat-
ing system that constructs unikernels
for secure, high-performance network
applications”: a collection of OCaml
libraries that can be assembled into
a standalone kernel running on top
of the Xen hypervisor. Security is a
core feature of MirageOS, making it
a natural target to demonstrate inte-
gration of our encoders and decoders.
Concretely, this entails patching the
mirage-tcpip1 library to replace its
1https://github.com/mirage/mirage-tcpip
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serializers and deserializers by our
own and evaluating the resulting code in a realistic network application. We chose the mirage.io
website (mirage-www on OPAM), which shows that the overhead of using our decoders in a real-life
application is very small.
Setup. After extracting the individual encoders and decoders to OCaml, we reprogrammed
the TCP, UDP, IPv4, ARPv4, and Ethernet modules of the mirage-tcpip library to use our code
optionally, and we recompiled everything. This whole process went smoothly: Mirage’s test suite
did not reveal issues with our proofs, though we did have to adjust or disable some of Mirage’s
tests (for example, one test expected packets with incorrect checksums to parse successfully, but
our decoders reject them).
We strove to integrate into mirage-tcpip with minimal code changes: the vast majority of our
changes affect the five files concerned with marshaling and unmarshaling our supported formats.
This yields a good estimate of the amount of modification required (roughly 15 to 30 lines of
glue code for each format), but it leaves lots of optimization opportunities unexplored: we incur
significant costs doing extra work and lining up mismatched representations. Additionally, because
we are strict about rejecting nonconforming packets, we perform new work that Mirage was not
performing, such as computing checksums at parsing time or validating consistency constraints
(Mirage’s packet decoders are a combination of hand-written bounds checks and direct reads at
automatically computed offsets into the packets).
Benchmarking. To evaluate the performance of the resulting application, we ran the mirage-www
server atop our modified mirage-tcpip and measured the time needed to load pages from the
mirage.io website as we replaced each component by its verified counterpart (we repeated each
measurement 250 times, using the window.performance.timing counters in Firefox to measure
page load times). The incremental overhead of our verified decoders and encoders is minimal,
ranging from less than 1% on small pages to 0.5-4% on large pages, such as the blog/ page of the
MirageOS website (accessing it causes the client to fetch about 4.2 MB of data, obtained through 36
HTTP requests spread across 1040 TCP segments):
0.00s 0.50s 1.00s 1.50s
 MirageOS ('blog/' page)
 + verified Ethernet encoding & decoding (+3.6%)
 + verified IPv4 encoding & decoding (+1.0%)
 + verified TCP encoding & decoding (+2.8%)
7 RELATEDWORK
Parsers for Context-Free Languages. There is a long tradition of generating parsers for context-free
languages from declarative Backus-Naur-form specifications [27, 41] automatically. Such generators
may themselves have errors in them, so in order to reduce the trusted code base of formally verified
compilers, there have been a number of efforts in verifying standalone parsers for a variety of
context-free languages [10, 11, 28, 31, 45]. In closely related work, the authors of RockSalt [38]
developed a regular-expressions DSL, equipped with a relational denotational semantics, in order
to specify and generate verified parsers from bitstrings into various instruction sets. In subsequent
work, Tan and Morrisett [51] extended this DSL to support bidirectional grammars in order to
provide a uniform language for specifying and generating both decoders and encoders, proving a
similar notion of consistency to what we present here. Importantly, all of these works focus on
languages that are insufficient for many network protocols. Additionally, these parsers produce
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ASTs for types defined by input grammars; these ASTs may need to be processed further (possibly
using semantic actions) to recover original source values. This processing phase must itself be
verified to guarantee correctness of the entire decoder.
Verification of Parsers for Network Protocol Formats. A wide range of tools have been used to
verify generated parsers for binary network protocol formats [6, 14, 43, 46, 50], including the
SAW symbolic-analysis engine, [18], the Frama-C analyzer [15], F* [50], Agda [52], and Coq. The
correctness properties of each project differ from Narcissus’s: Amin and Rompf [6] focus on
memory safety. While Protzenko et al. [43] and Collins et al. [14] prove that a pair of encoder and
decoder functions satisfy a round-trip property similar to ours, relying on deterministic functions
rules out many common formats, including DNS packets, Google Protocol Buffers, or formats using
ASN.1’s BER encoding. In addition, some of these approaches only support constrained sets of
formats: Collins et al. [14] are restricted to ASN.1 formats, while Simmons [46] requires the format
to align with the source type. van Geest and Swierstra [52] also use a library of parsers and pretty
printers for a fixed set of data types to build implementations, but they rely on verified datatype
transformations to support a more flexible set of formats, including IPv4 headers. More closely
related is the verified protocol-buffer compiler of Ye and Delaware [54], whose development adopts
Narcissus’s definition of correctness for top-level decoders and reuses its format for fixed-length
words. That effort did not adopt Narcissus’s combinator-based philosophy, as the compiler was
hand-written and manually verified in Coq, and is limited to formats in the fixed data-description
language of the Protocol Buffer standard.
Deductive Synthesis. The idea of deriving correct-by-construction implementations from specifica-
tions using deductive rules has existed for at least half a century [17, 34]. Kestrel’s Specware [48] sys-
tem was an seminal realization of this idea, and has been used to implement correct-by-construction
SAT solvers [47], garbage collectors [42], and network protocols. Deductive approaches have been
employed more recently to interactively derive verified recursive functions in a general purpose pro-
gramming language [30] and cache-efficient implementations of divide-and-conquer algorithms [26].
Very closely related is the Fiat framework [13, 16] for interactively deriving abstract data types
inside of Coq with domain-specific specifications and proof automation. Narcissus builds upon
Fiat, reusing its implementation of the aforementioned nondeterminism monad, in addition to
some of its datatype definitions and common datatype definitions and general proof automation
tactics. These dependencies represent a small portion of the Fiat library; the remaining aspects of
Narcissus presented in this paper are novel, including the problem domain, the specifications of
decoder/encoder correctness and the formulation of formats used in those specifications, and the
derivation tactics for encoders and decoders.
Parser-Combinator Libraries. There is a long history in the functional-programming community
of using combinators [32] to eliminate the burden of writing parsers by hand, but less attention
has been paid to the question of how to generate both encoders and decoders. Kennedy [29]
presents a library of combinators that package serializers and deserializers for data types to/from
bytestrings (these functions are also called picklers and unpicklers) into a common typeclass. A
similar project extended Haskell’s Arrow class [25] with a reverse arrow in order to represent
invertible functions [5]. Inmore closely relatedwork, Rendel andOstermann developed a combinator
library for writing pairs of what they term partial isomorphisms [44]; that is, partial functions each
of which correctly invert all values in the other’s range. The authors give a denotational semantics
for their EDSL using a relational interpretation that closely mirrors Narcissus’s. Importantly,
proofs of correctness for these libraries, where they exist, are strictly informal.
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Bidirectional / Invertible Programming Languages. Mu et. al present a functional language in which
only injective functions can be defined, allowing users to invert every program automatically [39].
The authors give a relational semantics to this language, although every program in the language is
a function. The authors show how to embed noninjective programs in their language automatically
by augmenting them with sufficient information to invert each computation. They prove that this
additional information can be dropped given a user-provided inversion function.
Boomerang [12] is a bidirectional programming language for projecting transformations on a
data view back to the original source data; in contrast to Narcissus, Boomerang does not require
that the original source values can be recovered from a target view. Boomerang programs are built
using a collection of lens combinators, which include get, put, and create operations for transporting
modifications between source and target representations. While Boomerang originally synthesized
functions that assumed that every source value had a canonical target representation, it has since
been extended with quotient lenses that relax this restriction [23]. The recently developed Optician
tool [36] synthesizes Boomerang programs that implement bijective string transformations from
regular expressions describing source and target formats and sets of user-provided disambiguating
examples. The format-decoding problem differs from the lens setting in that lenses consider how
to recover a new source value from an updated target value given full knowledge of the old source
value, while decoding must work given only a single target value.
Extensible Format-Description Languages. Interface generators like XDR [49], ASN.1 [19], Apache
Avro [7], and Protocol Buffers [53] generate encoders and decoders from user-defined data schemes.
The underlying data format for these frameworks can be context-sensitive, but this format is defined
by the system, however, preventing data exchange between programs using different frameworks.
The lack of fine-grained control over the target representation prevents users from extending the
format, which could bring benefits in dimensions like compactness, even ignoring the need for
compatibility with widely used standards.
The binpac compiler [40] supports a data-format-specification language specifically developed
for network protocols but does not support extending the language beyond the built-in constructs.
More recent frameworks, like PADS [20], PacketTypes [35], and Datascript [8], feature sophisticated
data-description languages with support for complex data dependencies and constraints for specific
data schemes but also lack support for extensions. Nail [9] is a tool for synthesizing parsers and
generators from formats in a high-level declarative language. Nail unifies the data-description
format and internal data layout into a single specification and allows users to specify and auto-
matically check dependencies between encoded fields. More importantly, Nail natively supports
extensions to its parsers and generators via user-defined stream transformations on the encoded
data, allowing it to capture protocol features that other frameworks cannot. However, Nail provides
no formal guarantees, and these transformations can introduce bugs violating the framework’s
safety properties. We also note two other differences between Nail and Narcissus. First, Nail has
many more orthogonal primitives than Narcissus, as our primitives may be considered to be little
more than the definition of decoder correctness. Second, while Nail provides flexibility in describing
binary formats, it maps each format to a fixed C struct type, where Narcissus is compatible with
arbitrary Coq types.
8 CONCLUSION
We have presented Narcissus, a framework for specifying and deriving correct-by-construction
encoders and decoders for non-context-free formats in the style of parser-combinator libraries.
This framework provides fine-grained control over the shape of encoded data, is extensible with
user-defined formats and implementation strategies, has a small set of core definitions augmented
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with a library of common formats, and produces machine-checked proofs of soundness for derived
decoders and encoders. We evaluated the expressiveness of Narcissus by deriving decoders and
encoders for several standardized formats and demonstrated the utility of the derived functions by
incorporating them into the OCaml-based Mirage operating system.
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